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PRICING TO MARKET BEHAVIOR IN OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION:  
A MICROECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
 
Jacint Balaguer, Vicente Orts and Ezequiel Uriel  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper takes into account the presence of oligopolistic rivalry between exporters to 
evaluate their pricing to market behavior. We specify the pricing policy as a 
simultaneous equation model, which captures the effects of possible interactions in 
multiple destination markets. The use of information related to multiple transactions 
helps to alleviate the cost measurement problem found in the typical analyses on prices 
and exchange rates. Furthermore, the exogenous variations of the exporters' exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the currency of each destination market will enable us to identify the 
reaction functions. The empirical approach is applied to the European ceramic tiles 
industry, where Italian and Spanish exporters compete. Prices are strategic complements 
and the markup adjustments, caused directly by exchange rate variations, are amplified 
by the feedback effects on rival's prices. 
 Keywords: Exchange rates; Reaction functions; Pricing to market 
JEL classification: F12; F14; L13 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo consideramos la presencia de rivalidad oligopolística entre exportadores 
con objeto de evaluar la presencia de "pricing to market". Especificamos la política de 
precios mediante un modelo de ecuaciones simultáneas que recoge los efectos de las 
posibles interacciones existentes en múltiples mercados de destino de las exportaciones. 
El problema de estimación de costes, típico en el análisis de precios y tipos de cambio, 
se resuelve mediante el uso de información relativa a múltiples transacciones. Por otra 
parte, las variaciones exógenas del tipo de cambio de la moneda de los exportadores 
frente a la de cada mercado de destino permitirá identificar las funciones de reacción. 
La aproximación empírica obtenida se aplica a la industria europea de pavimentos y 
revestimientos cerámicos en la que los exportadores españoles y italianos compiten. Los 
resultados indican que los precios actúan como complementarios estratégicos y que los 
ajustes de márgenes de beneficio, causados directamente por las variaciones en los tipos 
de cambio, son amplificados por la retroalimentación existente sobre los precios de los 
rivales. 
Palabras clave: tipos de cambio; funciones de reacción; "Pricing to market" 
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1. Introduction 
Since the second half of the 1980s, the studies that have arisen from the renewed 
interest in the relationship between exchange rate changes and traded goods price 
adjustments have been greatly enriched by the application of models of industrial 
organization. The paper by Dornbusch (1987) is a good example of this phenomenon. It 
shows that models that dispense with the traditional assumption of perfect competition 
are very useful to explain why exchange rate variations are seldom completely reflected 
in the importer's currency prices in a given market (i.e. incomplete exchange rate pass-
through). From the analysis offered it is clearly inferred that, in the particular case of 
oligopolistic market structure, strategic interactions should be considered for the 
determination of price equilibriums following exchange rate movements. Although 
rivalry effects could be very relevant, this fact contrasts with the approach adopted in 
many empirical studies on this issue, where the competitors' prices are not taken into 
account. Furthermore, until recently, the few studies that have tried to take the 
competitors' prices into account have been limited to using aggregate price indices for 
substitute products as a control variable. This is where Gross and Schmitt's (2000) paper 
comes in as an original piece of research work. The authors take new developments in 
time series econometrics to analyze the degree of exchange rate pass-through for 
imported automobiles in Switzerland by considering the prices of each source country 
as an endogenous variable. In their paper, unit labor costs and the producer price index 
in manufacturing are used as proxy variables of the marginal cost. The fundamental 
reason for the use of cost indices is that economic marginal cost cannot be observed in a 
straightforward manner. Although the use of accounting data is quite typical in 
empirical research concerning the exchange rate pass-through, it is an important 
drawback according to the tradition of "new empirical industrial organization" studies 
(surveyed in Bresnahan, 1989). In general, even if observable indices could be a 
reasonable measure of the average cost, they are not an appropriate measure of the 
evolution of marginal costs. This empirical problem is emphasized by the latest 
generation of studies focused more sharply on the issue of pricing to market behavior 
(Krugman, 1987)
1. Therefore, Golberg and Knetter (1997) deduce that cost indices may 
                                                 
1 The pricing to market behavior refers to specific markup adjustments in response to changes in 
exchange rate against the destination market. The policy acts as an active international price 
discrimination across different destination markets. The incomplete exchange rate pass-through is 
frequently associated with the presence of these markup adjustments.   5
introduce measurement errors that are correlated with exchange rates in a way that 
biases the estimated coefficients toward finding an excess of markup adjustments. 
To solve this problem, Knetter (1989) proposed an original alternative in which 
no assumptions about functional form of the marginal cost have been made. The 
alternative is based on the idea that the idiosyncratic prices, fixed to several closely 
related markets, provide a way to disentangle cost variations from markup changes. 
More specifically, in order to capture marginal cost evolution Knetter assumes that, on 
the border of the exporter country, this variable is independent of the destination-
market, in contrast with markup adjustments. 
In the present paper, we highlight the interest in extending Knetter's multimarket 
model. The aim is to explore a useful method to study pricing to market behavior for 
exporters that compete under an oligopolistic market structure. The econometric model 
will allow prices fixed by each competitor to interact following an exchange rate shock, 
as in Gross and Schmitt's research
2. Furthermore, as in Knetter's approach, we will be 
able to disentangle markup changes without resorting to proxy variables of marginal 
cost. 
The proposed empirical model is used in order to provide evidence for the 
European ceramic tiles industry, where we deal with oligopolistic rivalry among 
producers at country level. We chose this particular industry for at least three reasons. 
First, the production of ceramic tiles is highly concentrated in Italy and Spain, and these 
countries supply the rest of the European markets
3. Production of ceramic tiles in both 
source countries represents more than 80% of the total production in the European 
Union. In this context, since the domestic production in the rest of the European Union 
countries is relatively low and market share of Italian and Spanish firms on total imports 
is high for many of destination countries (see Table 1 and 2), we analyze the effect of 
price rivalry in a straightforward way by considering a duopoly competition model. 
Second, in the European markets Italian and Spanish exporters are not subject to tariffs 
or quantitative restrictions. Therefore, our analysis can be considered to be free of 
                                                 
2 This preceding work is also focused on the dynamic properties of the exchange rate pass-through. 
3 Therefore, both countries are the main exporters in the world. For a good description of the evolution of 
the ceramic tiles industry, see European Commission (1997).   6
distortions
4. Third, Italy and Spain produce and export different brands of ceramic tiles
5, 
and in a similar fashion the pricing behavior in each source country could be associated 
with the behavior of the exporters of the corresponding product brand. 
Table 1. Production of ceramic tiles (m
2 in millions and percentage on the European Union) 
Area 1993  1996 
Italy 453  50.00% 555 46.91%
Spain 281  31.20% 424 35.84%
European Union  906  1183
Note: From Sezzi (1995) and Sezzi (1997). In 1993 the European 
Union excludes Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
Table 2. Imports of Italian and Spanish ceramic tiles by country (in percentage on total imports of 
ceramic tiles) 
Country Spain Italy Total 
France 11.20 61.92 73.12 
United Kingdom  39.32 28.58 64.90 
Belgium-Luxemburg 11.03 48.98 60.01 
Ireland 35.68 28.09 63.77 
Greece 27.98 61.87 89.95 
Portugal 89.66 2.99 92.65 
Germany 7.16 65.63 72.79 
Netherlands 12.28 40.42 52.70 
Denmark 4.67 48.90 53.57 
Note: We refer to product 690890 (following Combined Nomenclature codes) on 
the period 1988-1997. Source COMEXT (Eurostat). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we illustrate different 
market structures consistent with the economic framework used in this study. Section 3 
provides the econometric model and the empirical results obtained for the European 
ceramic tiles industry. A final section contains the concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
4 The international pricing behavior could be affected by the presence of trade restrictions. See, for 
example, Feenstra (1989) and Goldberg (1995). The first author shows the effect both exchange rates and 
tariffs on prices for several industries. The second author's interest lies in obtaining the effects of quotas 
on prices. 
5 The difference between brands of ceramic tiles lies essentially in the color and physical characteristics 
of the basic materials.   7
2. The  economic  framework 
Let us suppose two firms that export different brands of the same goods. Each of 
these firms belong to different countries and compete in N separate international 
markets. The first-order conditions for profit maximization will imply that, on the 
border of each exporter country, firms equate the marginal revenue from sales in each 
destination market to common marginal cost. Thereby, the log of the optimal price for 
the exporter firms expressed in their own currency pj (j=1,2) can be written as: 
11 1 it t it pm c µ =+    (1) 
22 2 it t it pm c µ =+    (2) 
i=1,...,N 
t=1,...,T 
where, in each equation, mc represents the log of common marginal cost and µ the log 
of destination-specific markup. 
Let us assume that markup depends on the firm's own export price and, 
furthermore, on the rival's price, both expressed in terms of the buyer's currency 
(henceforth, local-currency). Then, if we define ejit as the log of the exchange rate 
between the currency of the seller j ( j=1,2) and the local-currency of the market i 
(expressed in units of the seller's currency per unit of the local-currency), an 
approximation to the destination-specific markup for the exporters can be written as 
follows
6: 
11 1 1 2 22 1 () ( )
it it it it it i ap e bp e c µ =− +− +    (3) 
22 2 21 1 12 () ( )
it it it it it i ap e bp e c µ =− + − +  (4) 
                                                 
6 Little empirical work has been carried out that considers the rival's price as a further determinant of the 
variable markup. The studies of Hung et al. (1993) and Kongsted (1998) are some examples. 
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where coefficients a and b will be interpreted as the local-currency prices elasticities of 
markup. We expect that a≤0 and b≥0. Lastly, c≥0 represents an intercept which captures 
the constant specific markup for each destination market. 
Substituting equations 3 and 4 into equations 1 and 2, respectively, and solving 
for each of the export prices, we obtain each firm's policy in terms of price reaction 
functions: 
1





it i t it it it
a
p cm cb eb p e
aa









it i t it it it
a
p cm cb eb p e
aa
=+ − + −
−−
 (6) 
When coefficients b are 
non-zero, it is easy to infer that 
there is interdependence in the pri-
cing policy of exporters. Therefore, 
an exchange rate variation affects 
the export price via the induced 
effect on the rival's price. To illus-
trate price interdependence, and its 
importance in the price determina-
tion following an exchange rate 
shock, Figure 1 plots the functions 
for a destination market i 
7. For the 
sake of simplicity we have 
supposed that marginal cost is constant. Additionally, if we assume the conventional 
case in which coefficients a are negative and b are positive, both reaction functions are 
upward sloping in the export price space, thus showing that prices are strategic 
complements (Bulow et al., 1985). The schedules E1 and E2 are the reaction functions 
and the initial equilibrium is represented at A.  
                                                 
7 Reaction functions for an exporter and for domestic production can be seen in Dornbusch's (1987) 
"extended Dixit-Stiglitz model". It could be considered a particular case of our illustration, in which only 
the exchange rate between the currency of the exporter and the destination market i exists. In contrasts 
with our analysis, both prices are expressed in domestic currency because Dornbush focused on the 











Figure 1. Reaction functions and export prices equilibrium   9
An exogenous shock of the currency of the exporter 1's country, i.e. an 
appreciation (e1it falls), ceteris paribus, will shift the reactions functions down and to the 
right. The new equilibrium after the exchange rate shock is therefore at A'. Since there 
is no variation in marginal cost, the new price of exporter 1, 
'
t p , is completely defined 
by the intensity of markup adjustments following this shock. In this case, both the slope 
and the magnitude of the shift in reaction functions imply a reduction in exporter 1 price 
(expressed in his own currency). From the equations 5 and 6 we can measure the degree 
of pricing variation of their own price in response to the exchange rate fluctuation 
against the market i (net of the possible effects on marginal cost), that is, the pricing to 
market for exporter 1 is as following: 
1
1 12 1 2
1





p aa b b
ea a b b
ϕ
 ∂ −−−
==   ∂− − − 
 (7) 
where all the elasticities related to the markups of both exporters are involved. 
Obviously, the pricing to market behavior for exporter 2 is symmetrical, and could be 
expressed as: 
2
2 21 2 1
2





p aa b b
ea a b b
ϕ
 ∂ −− −
==   ∂− − − 
 (8) 
The alternative hypothesis of no strategic interaction can also be inferred from 
the present analysis in a straightforward manner. The presence of zero coefficients in 
equations 5 and 6 is consistent with additional market structures and, furthermore, from 
equations 7 and 8 we can obtain the degree of pricing to market associated to each of 
them.  
First, in the case that coefficients a are non-zero, but coefficients b are zero, each 
competitor firm will be ignored and we obtain a monopoly market structure where the 
specific fluctuations in exchange rates could affect markups via variations in each firm's 
own price (expressed in local-currency). As Knetter (1989, 1993) points out, the 
importance of pricing to market behavior will depend on the demand convexity as it is 
perceived by the exporter
8. In the typical case of pricing to market, demand becomes 
                                                 
8  While in the simple monopoly case, the degree of pricing to market is linked with the market demand 
convexity, in a more general case of monopolistic competition market structure it will be linked with the 
"residual" demand convexity.   10
more elastic as local-currency prices rise. In this case, an increment in the local-
currency price, caused by an exporter's currency appreciation (eji falls), would imply a 
decrease in the optimal markup and thus a certain degree of local-currency price 
stabilization. Since this behavior implies aj<0 (j=1,2), we obtain 0<ϕ j<1. Second, when 
local-currency price elasticities of markup are zero but cji≠0 for any destination market 
i, a fixed markup over marginal cost exists. In this case, the optimal markup will not 
change as exchange rate variations increase (or decrease) the price paid by the buyer. 
Since cji differs across destination markets, then the idiosyncratic markups indicate the 
presence of a policy of third-degree price discrimination. Third, when local-currency 
price elasticities of markup are constant aj=0 and, additionally, cji=0  for overall 
i=1,...N, the export prices are determined solely on the basis of the common marginal 
cost. This situation is compatible with the presence of a single competitive world 
market. 
3. The  econometric  specification: a case study  
In order to obtain a parsimonious specification we can express the exchange 
rates of equations 5 and 6 in terms of the domestic currency of the corresponding 
exporter. For this purpose, we decompose the bilateral exchange rate between the 
countries of the exporters 1 and 2 in the correspondent cross exchange rates against the 
currency of each destination market i  (which will be guaranteed for the triangular 
arbitrage transaction in the spot foreign exchange markets). Hence, e12t≡e1it-e2it and 
e21t≡e2i-e1i, and equations 5 and 6 can be rewriting as follows: 
2
12 2





it i t t it it
ab b
p cm c b e ep
aa a a
+










it i t t it it
ab b
p cm c b e ep
aa a a
+
=+ − − +
−− − −
 (10) 
If we define that α1=(-a1-b2)/(1-a1),  β1=b2/(1-a1),  α2=(-a2-b1)/(1-a2) and 
β2=b1/(1-a2), a fixed effects model can be obtained directly from the equations 
represented in 9 and 10: 
11 1 1 11 21 it i t it it it p ep u λθα β =++ + +   (11)   11
22 2 2 22 1 2 it i t it it it p ep u λθα β =++ + +   (12) 
where λ1i and λ2i are the corresponding destination country effect, and θ1t and θ2t are 
time effects which capture the common variations in the corresponding export prices to 
the N destination markets. Lastly, u1it and u2it are the regression disturbance terms. 
From the econometric model, we examine the predictions on pricing to market in 
a duopoly framework using a data set of nearly 2000 monthly observations of 
international prices corresponding to glazed ceramic flags and paving products shipped 
by Spain and Italy to 9 destination markets
9. We include the main European destination 
countries in which both exporters compete: France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Belgium-Luxemburg, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Greece and Portugal. The period 
considered is from the birth of the Community Integrated Tariff (January 1988) until the 
moment in which the exchange rate fluctuations between both exporting countries and 
European importing countries stopped being notable (March 1997). Therefore, the 
exogenous variations in each exporter's exchange rate vis-à-vis the currency of each 
destination market i will enable us to identify the pricing equations. 
The export price equations 11 and 12 have been estimated by the 3SLS 
procedure. Results are shown in Table 3.
10 A general outcome is that all the α and β 
coefficients are statistically significant at a conventional level. This empirical finding 
indicates that the idiosyncratic effects on exporters' prices caused by the changes in 
conditions of each destination market are relevant.  
The estimations can be interpreted in a more comprehensive form if we deduce 
the original local-currency price elasticities of markup. The coefficients aj (j=Spain, 
Italy) provide information about the effects on markup caused by a variation in the 
firm's own local-currency price apart from, obviously, a possible induced effect on the 
rival's price. The negative value of the corresponding estimation indicates that an 
                                                 
9 Data on shipments were obtained from the COMEXT database (EUROSTAT). In this database, 
harmonized data for the European exporter countries at industry level are available. The unit values are 
calculated in FOB terms. The product studied includes hearth or wall tiles and corresponds to 
classification code 690890. Ceramic goods made of siliceous fossil meals or similar siliceous, refractory 
ceramic goods, tiles made into stands, ornamental articles and tiles specifically manufactured for stoves 
are excluded. On the other hand, exchange rates used were those of the International Financial Statistics 
(published by the International Monetary Fund). 
10 No significant changes in estimates results occur when some destination countries, where market share 
of Spanish or Italian firms on total imports of product are smaller, are excluded.   12
increase (decrease) in the Spanish and Italian local-currency price would reduce 
(increase) their respective markups, as is expected. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients, which are -61.50 and -110.11 for Spain and Italy respectively, indicate that 
markups are very sensitive to the variations of the firm's own prices expressed in local-
currency terms. Consequently, we find that the direct effects on export prices caused by 
exchange rate shocks are very important (0.99 for the Spanish exporters and 0.98 for the 
Italian exporters). This result implies that ceramic tile exporters tend towards greater 
markup adjustments with the aim of stabilizing their prices in terms of the local-
currency. This phenomenon, frequently known as complete local-currency price 
stabilization, is not rejected by the Wald test at 5% significance level (χ
2(2)=4.55) for 
both exporting countries. However, pricing to market behavior might not be no 
completely defined by the direct effect caused by exchange rate fluctuations. Since the 
estimate for coefficients b is non-zero, interaction in prices should be taken into 
consideration to obtain the total effects of exchange rate shocks on the export prices 
equilibrium. From the value of these estimated coefficients we find that an increase 
(decrease) in the rival's price in buyer's currency, considerably increases (reduces) the 
firm's own markup. This outcome implies that the slope of each reaction function is 
positive and prices are strategic complements, as we expected.  
Table 3. Pricing equations for the European ceramic tiles industry 
Estimated coefficients and 
pricing to market (ϕ j) 
(j=Spain, Italy; k=Italy, Spain; k≠  j) 











aj  -61.50 -110.11 
-aj/(1-aj) 0.98  0.99 
bk  50.94 138.33 
bk/(1-aj) 0.81  1.24 
ϕ j  2.09 1.61 
Wald test Ho; α Spain + β Spain= 1 and α Italy + β Italy=1       χ
2(2)=4.55 (0.10) 
Note: Estimation has been performed with LIMDEP 7.0 using six-monthly time effects. ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses below the coefficients are t-
statistics. The probability value is in parentheses for the chi-square distribution. 
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Lastly, we obtained an estimation for the pricing to market by taking into 
account the induced effects caused by price interactions. Results show that the 
magnitude of pricing to market estimation is 2.09 for the Spanish exporters and 1.61 for 
the Italian exporters, which indicates that price interdependence amplifies the direct 
effects on export prices to a substantial extent. Both Spanish and Italian exporters revise 
their markups taking into account the induced effects on the rival in response to 
exchange rate changes against the currencies of destination markets. Findings reveal 
that export price could vary to a greater degree than the exchange rate fluctuation due to 
rivalry effects. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose an empirical approach in the tradition of the "new 
empirical industrial organization" framework to study international pricing behavior in 
oligopolistic competition. The aim of the analysis is capture the possible effects of price 
rivalry between exporters on pricing to market behavior. To do so, we have made use of 
a simple model of duopoly which has been applied for the European ceramic tiles 
industry.  
The papers of Knetter (1989) and Gross and Schmitt (2000) constitute the most 
direct empirical antecedents of the present research. We can also consider our analysis 
as an extension of Knetter's model insofar as it enables us to investigate the pricing 
policy in the presence of price interactions. Furthermore, this paper could represent a 
suitable alternative to Gross and Schmitt's approach to studying export price reactions 
following the exchange rate changes that come about when information related to 
transactions to multiple destination markets is available. In this case, it will be not 
necessary for a variable proxy to represent marginal cost, which could be an important 
advantage in the empirical analysis. 
Evidence for the European ceramic tiles industry, where the Spanish and Italian 
exporters are basically the only competitors, has been put forward. The rejection of the 
perfectly competitive market structure and the segmentation of the European market is a 
direct result in the case of this industry. Estimations show that the direct response to 
exchange rate variations vis-à-vis the currency of each destination market is a strong 
destination-specific adjustment of markups for both exporter countries. Therefore, the 
markup adjustments, which are induced directly from the exchange rate fluctuations,   14
would allow price stabilization in local-currency terms. Nevertheless, we have obtained 
evidence that shows that the pricing interactions between the Spanish and Italian 
exporters do matter and, in turn, this fact affects the degree of pricing to market. More 
specifically, we found that the export prices in the ceramic tiles industry are strategic 
complements and, furthermore, the pricing interactions following an exchange rate 
shock amplify the initial markup adjustments caused directly by the exchange rate 
variation. 
This study could contribute to a better understanding of the role of rivalry in the 
determination of the pricing to market behavior. One essential finding of our research is 
that, in an oligopolistic market structure, the exchange rate variations can have 
significant feedback effects on rivals' prices and, therefore, pricing interactions should 
be considered in the model specification. In this context, the use of prices for 
competitors with the aim of controlling for substitute products can be insufficient and 
the alternative proposed in this paper could be more satisfactory.   15
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